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1. Introduction 
 
The past decade was witness to an unprecedented rise in the number and percentage of 
electoral democracies in the world. The number of countries in which elections are 
competitive and meet minimum standards of freedom and fairness reached a new high-water 
mark in 2001, with 122 (or 63 percent) of the world’s 192 countries qualifying as ‘electoral 
democracies’ (Freedom House, 2001). This marks a threefold increase from the situation 
applying in 1989, at the end of the Cold War. Indeed, more governments today have been 
chosen via free and fair elections than at any time in history. 
 
Many of these elections have been held in post-conflict societies with the assistance, 
supervision or sometimes direct control of the international community. The basic principle 
that governments should be chosen by the ballot, not the bullet, has become enshrined as an 
‘emerging right’ in international law (Franck 1992). In post-conflict societies, competitive 
elections have become one of the instruments used not only to promote democracy but also to 
attempt to consolidate a fragile peace. In such cases, elections provide an inescapable means 
for jump-starting a new, post-conflict political order; for stimulating the development of 
democratic politics; for choosing representatives; for forming governments; and for 
conferring legitimacy upon the new political order. They also provide a clear signal that 
legitimate domestic authority has been returned – and hence that the role of the international 
community may be coming to an end. For all of these reasons, elections have become a 
central part of the process of state rebuilding.  
 
This is particularly so for first-time elections in countries transitioning from authoritarian rule 
or civil war. In some cases, such as Namibia in 1989 or Mozambique in 1994, elections 
clearly played a vital role in making a decisive break with the past. In others, such as 
Angola’s abortive 1992 elections held under the Bicesse peace accord, flawed elections 
created more problems than they solved. Haiti’s parliamentary and presidential elections in 
1995 led to the first ever transition of power, but administrative inefficiencies undermined the 
credibility of the broader electoral process. By contrast, in Cambodia, technically successful 
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electoral processes were soon overwhelmed by the realities of power politics as the ‘losing’ 
party at the elections returned to power through hard-line tactics. In Bosnia, premature 
elections helped nationalist parties cement an early grip on political power, while in Kosovo 
and East Timor a more measured timetable appears to have helped the process of political 
development of the nascent political systems. 
 
As this brief list indicates, there has been a considerable variation in the relative success of 
elections in meeting the broader goals of institutionalization and consolidation of democracy 
from country to country and from case to case. There is also considerable variation in the 
extend to which such elections meet the vexed standard of being considered ‘free and fair’ by 
observers, the media and the international community. In general, a ‘free’ election typically is 
one in which contestation for office is open and competitive, and free from significant 
electoral violence; while ‘fair’ usually refers to features such as a level playing field, equal 
rights to participation, and acceptance of outcomes by all parties. In practice, however, there 
is a great variation in the meaning attached to this term, and it is has been difficult to identify 
a widely-accepted definition of what a ‘free and fair’ election constitutes in practice, although 
some attempts have been made (see Elklit and Svensson 1997). 
 
There is a considerable variation in the kinds of activities that international electoral 
assistance can comprise. At one extreme, many of the ‘institutional strengthening’ 
programmes focussed on electoral issues attempt to help build capacity within existing 
electoral commissions, and to assist them with generic issues such as budgeting, management, 
planning, staff recruitment, and so on. At the other extreme are complex plans for electoral 
systems design, reform of legal codes, constitutional changes and so on. Between these ‘low 
end’ and ‘high end’ approaches lies the bulk of electoral assistance, which is usually focussed 
on helping organize and run a specific election in a specific country, rather than any longer-
term commitment.  
 
Regardless of the range of assistance available, it is clear that for international actors and 
post-conflict societies alike, electoral assistance forces critical political choices to be made. 
Elections represent a key step in a broader process of political maturation and legitimation. 
The holding of elections can have a decisive influence on how the rhythm of peaceful 
democratic politics can evolve and become sustainable, to what extent the internal politics of 
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fragile new states become stabilized, and whether a peace settlement and new post-conflict 
regime comes to be viewed as legitimate.  
2. Elections in Post-Conflict Situations 
2.1 Critical Issues 
Despite their essential role, post-conflict elections can also be a source of tension, becoming a 
lightning-rod for popular discontent and extremist sentiments. Elections in conflictual 
situations often act as a catalyst for the development of parties and other organisations which 
are primarily (and often solely) vehicles to assist local elites gain access to governing power. 
They can promote a focus on regional, rather than national, issues. They can serve to place in 
positions of elected authority leaders committed to exclusionary visions of the country – 
leaders who are, in many cases, the very same ones who started or fought the conflict in the 
first place. This generals-to-politicians transformation has been a recurring problem in the 
Balkans, where nationalist parties and elites have attempted to use the political process to 
continue to press their sectarian aims. Post-conflict elections also tend to elicit more extreme 
reactions from voters than those held after an extended period of state rebuilding. 
 
In such cases, elections can have the perverse effect of undermining the broader process of 
democratisation. A common mistake is to hold elections too soon, before national political 
issues have progressed beyond the concerns of the previous conflict, and before more normal 
peacetime politics have had time to develop. In such a situation, elections can become a focus 
for violence, as the armies and other groups previously engaged in combat continue their  
conflict via the electoral process. While elections are an essential part of many peace 
agreements, ill-timed, badly-designed or poorly-run elections have often served to undermine 
peace processes in fragile post-conflict environments. 
Given this dilemma, what are the issues facing the international community when it engages 
in post-conflict electoral assistance? There are at least five main areas of variation which have 
a crucial influence on the shape of post-conflict electoral politics in most countries: 
 
•  First, there is the question of election timing: should national elections be held 
immediately after a conflict, to take advantage of a peace deal and quickly introduce 
  5 
the new democratic order? Or is it better to wait for a year or two so as to allow the 
political routines and issues or peacetime politics to come to prominence?  
 
•  Second is the matter of scheduling of national versus sub-national elections. Is it better 
to hold national elections before local ones, as some scholars have argued? Or, 
following emerging United Nations practice, should local-level elections be held in 
advance of national ones, in the hope of gradually inculcating voters to the rights and 
responsibilities of representative democracy? 
•  Third, there are the mechanics of elections themselves: who runs the elections? how are 
voters enrolled? how are electoral boundaries demarcated? what electoral formula is 
used? And so on. All of these decisions impact upon the way post-conflict politics 
develop, particularly the type of party constellations that are formed and the kind of 
appeals they make to voters and thus to the nature of electoral campaigning. 
•  Fourth, there is the matter of international election observation, monitoring and 
supervision. After placing huge resources on international electoral observation for most 
of the 1990s, there is now a renewed focus amongst international actors such as the 
European Union on the need to professionalize the process of electoral observation and 
to place more emphasis on building domestic capacity in this area. 
•  Fifth, there is the often under-estimated issue of the effect of post-conflict elections on 
the development of civil society and political parties. In post-conflict situations, many 
civil society organisations are weak or non-existent. In such cases, political parties are 
the key link between masses and elites, and play an absolutely crucial role in building 
a sustainable democratic polity. Hence, the interaction between civil society, political 
parties and the electoral process is itself crucial. The aim should be to promote the 
development of broad, programmatic party organizations with real links to the 
community. 
 
In all of these areas, great attention needs to be given to the way in which international 
assistance to elections impacts upon the broader course of democratic politics in post-conflict 
situations. The purpose of this paper is therefore to identify and analyse the crucial issues 
concerning international electoral assistance. 
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2.2 The Democratic Role of Elections 
Elections have three main functions in a democracy. First, they are means of choosing the 
people’s representatives to a legislature, congress or other representative forum, or to a single 
office such as the presidency. Second, elections are not just a means of choosing 
representatives but also of choosing governments. Indeed, in many established democracies, 
elections are primarily a contest between competing political parties to see who will control 
the government. Finally, elections are a means of conferring legitimacy on the political 
system. Especially since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of democratic 
governance around the world, elections have become an essential element in constituting a 
legitimate government. Today, there are very few states in the world that do not conduct 
elections, although the competitiveness and quality of these vary enormously. 
 
More generally, there is the overarching issue of under what circumstances elections can help 
to build a new democratic order, and under what circumstances they can undermine 
democracy and pave the way for a return to conflict. As one survey of post-conflict elections 
notes, the high expectations often put on post-conflict elections tend to be accompanied by a 
weakness in the preconditions for their success: "most war-torn societies lack the political 
climate, social and economic stability, institutional infrastructure, and even political will to 
mount successful elections" (Kumar 1998, 7). The international community has often not been 
sufficiently cognisant of the dangers in pushing for elections, particularly in countries which 
have recently emerged from civil war, without sufficient attention to the capacity of the host 
country to carry them out. 
 
Some critics contend that democracy itself is part of the problem in such highly fraught 
situations, and that post-conflict situations are too fragile to be exposed to the competitive 
pressures of the electoral process. But this oft-heard critique ignores several factors. First, 
elections can be purposively designed to encourage not winner-takes-all outcomes, but the 
sharing of power between groups. Indeed, many would argue that some form of power-
sharing is a primary requirement in post-conflict situations. Second, post-conflict countries 
inevitably face a real need to construct a legitimate governing authority. Not least because so 
many of today’s conflicts take place within states, the overarching challenge of international 
electoral assistance is thus to build or re-build a sustainable democratic state that can function 
without direct international involvement. Elections are a crucial element in achieving this. 
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2.3 Types of Electoral Assistance 
In order to develop and improve the accuracy, efficiency and legitimacy of such elections, and 
in the hope of building sustainable democratic practices in transitional states, the international 
community has become involved in a wide range of activities in the electoral field over the 
past decade. These include technical assistance for constitutional and legal reforms; advice on 
electoral systems, legislative structure and other political choices; assistance for the 
establishment and functioning of electoral management bodies; support for voter registration 
and education initiatives; financial, technical and strategic advice to political parties; support 
for civil society groups; provision of international monitors and observer groups; and so on. 
 
In all of these areas, a key issue is that whatever electoral processes are chosen, they need to 
be sustainable. While the international community plays an important ‘vector’ role in 
spreading new practices and technologies, there is a distinction between the ideal electoral 
technology and the capacity of a recipient country to handle that technology in a sustainable 
manner. A number of internationally-financed and run elections over the past decade have 
introduced a level of electoral technology which was clearly unsustainable for the host 
country, and could not be replicated in their second, locally-run elections. Cambodia (1993) 
and Mozambique (1994) both fall into this category. Similarly, donors need to move away 
from funding expensive one-off international election observation missions (otherwise known 
as ‘electoral tourism’) towards the longer-term benefits of directly supporting the domestic 
electoral administration and local observer groups. The latter is less glamorous but usually has 
a much greater pay-off in actually assisting the consolidation of a new democracy.  
 
Table 1 sets out the major sub-areas within the field of electoral assistance in which 
international support is usually focused. 
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This is a central element of most international electoral assistance programs. 
Support for free and fair elections can take many forms, although typically 
assistance is focused on issues of election planning, monitoring and budgeting. 
An increasing focus is on the use of low-cost, sustainable practices which will 





This kind of assistance often involves issues of political institutions and 
institutional reform, e.g. through design and reform of electoral systems, 
legislative structures, promoting links of accountability between the government 




bodies   
Assistance to electoral management bodies can be focussed on a range of areas, 
including voter registration, boundary delimitation, computerisation, dispute 
resolution and so on. A recent focus has been on the need to build independent 
and permanent electoral management bodies. 
Voter 
registration 
Concerns about the quality and usability of the voter register are a perennial 
issue of concern in post-conflict elections. Assistance with voter registration is 
often focused on the need for a permanent and continuous electoral register that 
is constantly updated to reflect population movements, new voters, births and 
deaths, and so on. 
Civic and voter 
education 
programmes 
Activities whose main goal is to expand democratic participation, particularly for 
women, the poor, indigenous groups and other under-represented segments of 
society.  This includes awareness-raising activities to highlight the rights and 




Includes election observation, monitoring and supervision. After placing huge 
resources on electoral observation for most of the 1990s, there is now more focus 
on the need to professionalize the process of international electoral observation 




Activities that focus on strengthening a country’s emerging party system, 
building parties’ internal capacity, and training parties to function effectively in 
the legislature. This is an emerging area in electoral assistance which is likely to 
take on increasing importance in the future. 
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3. Experiences and Lessons Learned 
 
3.1 Timing of Elections 
The intense international involvement in many post-conflict elections over the past decade is 
testament to the importance placed on the electoral process by the United Nations and other 
international organisations. However, the real challenge facing the international community is 
to help build sustainable procedures that function effectively without external assistance. In 
this area, progress has been slow. There is still a tendency to pay considerably more attention 
to a nation’s first election than subsequent ones, and many countries have been left with a 
legacy of expensive procedures and equipment after an internationally-supported transitional 
election that they cannot hope to replicate in the future. Similarly, subsequent elections 
beyond the first often fail to attract the intense international involvement that accompanies 
first-time elections in the shape of observer missions, monitoring and support.  
 
Over the last decade, UN peacekeeping missions appear to have developed a kind of standard 
operating procedure. Once a minimum level of peace has been obtained (which does not 
necessarily mean a full cease-fire agreement), and a basic level of infrastructure is in place, 
the next step is usually to hold some kind of elections -- often within a year or two of the start 
of the mission -- followed by a rapid hand-over to the newly-elected authorities, and an even 
more rapid departure of UN troops and personnel. One recurrent criticism of this approach to 
elections in post-conflict scenarios  is that, if held too early, they can undermine the nascent 
democratic order. In fact, this has been a fundamental problem of many UN-supervised 
elections: they have been held too soon and too quickly after peace has been restored. 
 
This problem affects all international actors involved in electoral assistance, not just the 
United Nations. For example in Kosovo there was strong pressure on the OSCE, as the body 
responsible for electoral matters, to hold elections as quickly as possible following the 
international intervention there, regardless of whether social conditions were conducive to the 
cut and thrust of open electoral politics or not.  
 
The timing of elections can also impact directly on the shape of the political party system, and 
on the degree of coordination between local and national-level elites. For example, a major 
goal in building a sustainable democracy should be the creation of parties which are broad-
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based, have strong links to local communities, and campaign on a national platform. But in 
post-conflict situations, many political parties are not broad-based vehicles for presenting 
competing policy and ideological platforms, but rather narrowly-focussed, personalized elite 
cartels. In other cases, political movements are often merely thinly-disguised variants of the 
armies which fought in the original conflicts, as exemplified in Bosnia by the growth of 
nationalist parties like the (Croat) HDZ, (Serb) SDS and (Bosniac) SDA, respectively. This 
problem also afflicts former liberation movements, such as East Timor’s Fretlin, or even the 
Kosovo Liberation Army, which attempt to transform themselves into mainstream political 
organisations. Either way, holding elections too early in the transition period can have the 
perverse effect of stymieing the development of more aggregative and programmatic political 
parties – institutions which are now widely accepted to be important facilitating agents for 
successful democratisation.  
 
A more immediate problem often comes not from domestic realm but from the approach 
taken by the international community itself. International policymakers, not least at the UN, 
have typically viewed elections as a convenient punctuation point in a peacekeeping mission, 
which can usher in not just a new government but also provide a convenient exit point for 
international involvement. This ‘exit strategy’ approach has severely undermined the efficacy 
of some of the largest electoral assistance operations. Thus Cambodia’s 1993 election, the 
culmination of the biggest UN peacekeeping mission to date, was followed by a rapid 
departure of the UN and other international forces from Cambodia – a departure which did 
little to translate results of an exemplary electoral process into solidifying a fragile new polity. 
Soon after, a ‘coup’ by the ‘second’ prime minister, Hun Sen, against the most popular 
elected party, FUNCINPEC, saw Cambodia return to its familiar politics of intimidation and 
authoritarian rule. Elsewhere, rushed elections (for example, in Liberia) with little in the way 
of broader political support, have undermined the legitimacy of the election process, creating 
further problems for future democracy-building efforts. 
 
Another issue is the coordination of election timing with sub-national elections. Some 
scholars argue that in a new democracy, holding national elections before regional elections 
generates incentives for the creation of national, rather than regional, political parties1 – and 
hence that the ideal process of election timing is to start at the national level and work one’s 
                                                 
1 Linz and Stepan 1996, 98-107 
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way down. Others such as Diamond believe that simultaneous national and local elections 
‘can facilitate the mutual dependence of regional and national leaders. The more posts that are 
filled at the regional and local level … the greater the incentive for regional politicians to 
coordinate their election activities by developing an integrated party system’.2 This was the 
situation at Indonesia’s 1999 elections, with identical party-based ballots being presented to 
voters at simultaneous elections for national, provincial and local assemblies, which greatly 
strengthened the nascent party system. In recent years, however, UN practice has been the 
opposite: to start with municipal elections and work up, as in Kosovo. This approach is 
particularly suited to ‘state building’ elections, which can help develop party politics from the 
ground up. 
 
Happily, there is evidence of genuine learning over time by the UN and other international 
actors on most of these issues. First, there is more recognition now of the need for sustained 
international involvement for several years after a conflict rather than the rushed ‘in-and-out’ 
approach of former years. Second, in recent major international assistance operations such as 
Kosovo, East Timor and now Afghanistan, pressure to hold instant national elections has been 
resisted. Instead, a two-year period of political development has been used to prepare the 
ground for elections as part of the much longer process of democratization. In both Kosovo 
and East Timor, relatively peaceful national elections were held in the second half of 2001. In 
Afghanistan, the two-year timeframe is being used again. Although questions remain as to 
whether even two years is time enough, there is now little doubt about the benefits of this 
more gradual approach. Third, the issue of local versus national elections seems to have been 
decided in favour of a two-step approach, with local elections coming first. In general, the 
comparative evidence suggests that this bottom-up approach to electoral timing is probably 
the best way to encourage the development of party politics and to inculcate voters in the 
routines of electoral politics. For example, the Lloya Jirga process of local elections in 
Afghanistan which was part of the process of choosing an interim government, can be seen as 
one kind of local election that clearly helped the nascent process of democratisation. 
 
3.2 Appropriateness of Electoral Systems 
Legal and constitutional issues, particularly the choice of electoral system, have long been 
recognised as one of the most important institutional choices for any political system. They can 
have profound implications for the extent to which the voices of the poor and other marginal 
                                                 
2 Diamond 1999, 158. 
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groups can be heard and their genuine power enhanced. For example, systems in which the 
parliament is elected from many small geographically-defined electoral districts tend not to be 
as good as representing minority opinion than proportional ones, but may be better at building 
links of accountability. These choices can also influence other aspects of the political system, 
such as the development of the party system, linkages between citizens and their leaders, 
political accountability, representation and responsiveness. Because of such impacts, 
constitutional and electoral system choices have many long-term consequences for the process 
of democratic governance, and the choice of electoral system is one of the most important 
political decisions for any country. 
Electoral systems are the rules and procedures via which votes cast in an election are translated 
into seats won in the parliament or some other office (e.g. a presidency). An electoral system is 
designed to do three main jobs. First, it will translate the votes cast into seats won in a 
legislative chamber. Second, electoral systems act as the conduit through which the people can 
hold their elected representatives accountable. Third, different electoral systems give incentives 
for those competing for power to couch their appeals to the electorate in distinct ways. In 
divided societies, for example, where language, religion, race or other forms of ethnicity 
represent a fundamental political cleavage, particular electoral systems can reward candidates 
and parties who act in a co-operative, accommodatory manner to rival groups; or they can 
punish these candidates and instead reward those who appeal only to their own group.   
Electoral systems are often categorized according to how proportionately they operate in terms 
of translating votes cast by electors into seats won by parties. A typical three-way structure 
divides such systems into plurality-majority, semi-proportional, and proportional representation 
(PR) systems. Plurality-majority systems typically give more emphasis to local representation 
via the use of small, single-member electoral districts than to proportionality. Amongst such 
systems are plurality (first-past-the-post), runoff, block and alternative vote systems. By 
contrast, proportional representation systems – which typically use larger multi-member 
districts and deliver more proportional outcomes -- include ‘open’ and ‘closed’ versions of 
party list PR, as well as ‘mixed-member’ and ‘single transferable vote’ systems. Semi-
proportional systems offer yet other approaches, as well as various mixtures of plurality and 
proportional models -- such as the ‘mixed’ models by which part of the parliament is elected via 
PR and part from local districts, a common choice in many new democracies over the past 
decade (see Reynolds and Reilly 1997). 
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Electoral systems also have a direct impact upon politics in societies divided along ethnic, 
religious, ideological or other lines. Donald Horowitz, for example, argues that ‘the electoral 
system is by far the most powerful lever of constitutional engineering for accommodation and 
harmony in severely divided societies, as indeed it is a powerful tool for many other 
purposes’.3 Arend Lijphart says that ‘the electoral system has long been recognized as 
probably the most powerful instrument for shaping the political system’.4 Timothy Sisk writes 
that electoral systems ‘play an important role in ‘engineering’ the results of democratic 
voting, and along with other institutional choices can have a profound impact on the nature of 
political parties and the general character of democracy’.5 Beyond this consensus on the 
importance of electoral systems, however, there is profound disagreement among theorists as 
to which electoral systems are most appropriate for divided societies (see Reilly and Reynolds 
1999).  
 
Two schools of thought predominate. The scholarly orthodoxy has long argued that some 
form of proportional representation (PR) is all but essential if democracy is to survive the 
travails of deep-rooted divisions. The electoral recommendations of ‘consociational’ 
approaches to managing ethnic cleavages in divided societies (Lijphart 1997) emphasise the 
need for divided societies to develop mechanisms for elite power-sharing, if democracy is to 
be maintained. In terms of electoral systems, consociationalists argue that some form of 
proportional representation is all but essential for divided societies, as this enables all 
politically-significant ethnic groups, including minorities, to form ethnically-based parties. 
This is based on the tendency of PR to produce multi-party systems and hence multi-party 
parliaments, in which all significant segments of the population can be represented, and on the 
empirical relationship between proportional electoral rules and ‘oversized’ or grand coalition 
governments, which are a fundamental feature of the power-sharing approach on which 
consociationalism is based. The use of large, multi-member electoral districts is particularly 
favoured, because it maximises proportionality and hence the prospects of multiple parties in 
parliaments, which can then form the basis of an cross-ethnic government coalition.6 PR 
election rules are thus important in themselves — because they are likely to facilitate 
proportional parliamentary representation of all groups — and also an important component 
                                                 
3 Horowitz 1991, 163. 
4 Lijphart 1991, 91. 
5 Sisk 1993, 79. 
6 See Lijphart 1990, 10-13. 
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of wider consociational prescriptions that emphasise the need for grand coalitions, group 
autonomy, and minority veto powers. 
 
In contrast to this orthodoxy, an alternative approach sometimes typified as ‘centripetalism’ 
maintains that the best way to mitigate the destructive effects of ethnicity in divided societies 
is not to simply replicate existing ethnic divisions in the legislature, but rather to utilise 
electoral systems that encourage cooperation and accommodation between rival groups, and 
therefore work to break down the salience of ethnicity rather than foster its representation in 
parliament. Drawing on theories of bargaining and cooperation, centripetalism advocates 
institutional designs which encourage opportunities for dialogue and negotiation between 
opposing political forces in the context of electoral competition. By privileging cooperative 
campaign strategies with increased prospects of electoral success, candidates representing 
competing (and sometimes violently opposed) interests are presented with incentives to 
negotiate for reciprocal support, creating an ‘arena of bargaining’ where vote-trading 
arrangements can be discussed.7  
 
Centripetalist approaches advocate the use of electoral rules which encourage ‘vote-pooling’ 
and ‘preference swapping’ in order to encourage inter-ethnic bargaining and promote 
accommodative behaviour. At the core of this approach is the need to make politicians 
reciprocally dependent on the votes of members of groups other than their own.8 The most 
reliable way of achieving this aim, according to proponents of the centripetal approach, is to 
offer sufficient electoral incentives for campaigning politicians to court voter support across 
ethnic lines. For example, some electoral models – such as preferential systems like the 
alternative vote (in Fiji) or the single transferable vote (Northern Ireland) -- permit (or even 
require) voters to declare not only their first choice of candidate on a ballot, but also their 
second, third and subsequent choices amongst all candidates standing. Parties that succeed in 
negotiating preference-trading agreements for reciprocal support with other parties will be 
rewarded, thus strengthening moderate voices and the political centre. This gives them strong 
institutional incentives both to engage in face-to-face dialogue with their opponents, and to 
negotiate on broader policy issues than purely vote-seeking ones. The overall effect is thus to 
reorient electoral politics away from a rigid zero-sum game to a more fluid, complex and 
potentially positive-sum contest. The success of ‘pro-peace’ forces at Northern Ireland’s 
                                                 
7 See Reilly 2001. 
8 See Horowitz 1985, 1991. 
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breakthrough 1998 election was dependent to a significant extent on such vote-transfers 
towards the moderate middle and away from extremists. Fiji’s transitional 1999 election also 
utilised centripetal procedures, as did the transitional 1990 election in Estonia. Sri Lanka and 
Papua New Guinea are other examples of countries in which centripetal electoral systems 
have been used. 
 
Regardless of whether consociational or centripetal approaches (or some mixture of the two), 
are favoured, there is widespread agreement amongst many scholars that some type of power-
sharing government featuring all significant groups is an essential part of democracy-building 
in divided societies. In particular, multi-ethnic coalitions are favoured by both 
consociationalists and centripetalists as desirable institutions for divided societies. 
 
Most of the major transitional elections conducted in recent years, including almost all of 
those held under UN auspices, have utilized some form of PR. In fact, transitional elections in 
Chile (1989), Namibia (1989), Nicaragua (1990), Cambodia (1993), South Africa (1994), 
Mozambique (1994), Liberia (1997), Indonesia (1999), Bosnia (1996,1998, 2000), Kosovo 
(2001) and East Timor (2001 were all conducted under proportional representation rules. In 
particular, the simplest form of proportional representation -- party-list PR – appears to have 
become the de facto norm of UN parliamentary elections. But the adoption of such systems 
for post-conflict elections has usually been dictated more by administrative concerns, such as 
the need to avoid demarcating individual electoral districts and to produce separate ballot 
papers for each districts, than these wider political issues. Indeed, in many post-conflict 
elections, national PR systems are the only feasible way to hold an election quickly, as a 
uniform national ballot can be used, no electoral districts need be demarcated, and the process 
of voter registration, vote counting and the calculation of results is consequently simplified. In 
Liberia in 1997, for example, population displacement and the lack of accurate census data 
led to the abandonment of the old system of single-member majoritarian constituencies in 
favour of a proportional system with a single national constituency (Lyons 1998, 182). 
 
However, national PR systems also have some disadvantages, as they provide no geographic 
link between voters and their representatives, and thus create difficulties in terms of political 
accountability and responsiveness between elected politicians and the electorate. In addition, 
many new democracies - particularly those in agrarian societies (Barkan 1995) - have much 
higher demands for constituency service at the local level than they do for representation of 
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all shades of ideological opinion in the legislature. It has therefore increasingly been argued in 
Namibia, South Africa, Cambodia and elsewhere that the proportional systems used at the 
first transitional elections should be modified to also encourage a higher degree of geographic 
accountability – such as by having members of parliament represent territorially-defined 
districts and service the needs of a constituency. A popular choice in recent years has been for 
‘mixed’ electoral systems, in which part of the legislature is elected on a national level by 
proportional representation, and some is elected at a local level from single-member districts, 
so that both the proportionality and accountability are maximised. For example, the August 
2001 elections for East Timor’s 88-member constituent assembly used a mixed system, with 
75 of the assembly’s seats elected on a nationwide basis by proportional representation, and 
13 seats (one for each district) elected by first-past-the-post. 
 
3.3 Independence of Election Administration 
While constitutional and legal reforms such as electoral systems have attracted a voluminous 
academic literature, issues of electoral administration remain under-studied by scholars and 
under-rated in general in terms of their effect on post-conflict polities. There are several models 
of election administration used around the world. Some countries locate responsibility for the 
administration of elections within a government portfolio like the interior or home affairs 
ministry. Other countries situate the responsibility for administration of elections within other 
aspects of governance, such as the public records office, the tax department or even the postal 
service. In some cases, the body responsible for running elections is created anew before each 
electoral event. And in some cases, the international community itself takes responsibility for 
running the elections. Probably the most important administrative decision concerns the 
composition of the body managing the elections, and specifically whether the elections are run 
by the government of the day or by some form of independent electoral commission. 
 
Despite this wide variation, comparative experience to date, as well as a global study of 
electoral management bodies (López-Pintor 2000), emphasize that independent and permanent 
electoral management bodies represent a clear best practice in terms of global electoral 
administration. Their perceived neutrality and independence from political interference lends 
credibility to the electoral process, which is a crucial determinant of the success of any election. 
A truly independent commission is one that is able to operate effectively without direct 
ministerial control, including in terms of its financial and administrative functions, and is 
(ideally) comprised of non-partisan appointees. In practice, many independent commissions 
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around the world do not have complete financial independence and may be comprised of party 
representatives rather than non-partisan appointments, but are still able to operate free from 
government interference or control. 
 
Secondly, the issue of the composition of electoral management bodies is also important. In 
some countries, electoral management bodies are comprised not of independent civil servants, 
judges or other officials, but rather by the political parties contesting the elections themselves. 
This practice is widespread in some areas, and can provide a form of non-partisan independence 
if the composition of party representation is balanced in such a way as to ensure genuinely 
neutral functioning. However, recent problems with this model in some important transitional 
elections (e.g. Indonesia), as well as in established democracies (e.g. the United States), 
emphasizes the propensity for politicization and deadlock that such structural arrangements can 
have, underlining the importance of careful composition of electoral management bodies. 
 
The world-wide trend is definitely towards independent electoral commissions staffed by non-
partisan civil servants; indeed, since the world’s largest democracy, India, adopted this model 
at independence it has been widely adopted around the world. However, the influence of the 
United States is important here, as the US form of electoral administration is based on 
political appointees and party representatives, and many post-conflict democracies, 
particularly in Latin America, have also adopted this model. Rafael López-Pintor argues that, 
when there is no better tradition or an existing body of widely respected independent civil 
servants, a party-based electoral authority may be the only realistic choice.9  
 
The comparative evidence, however, suggests that independent commissions run by apolitical 
civil servants are definitely to be preferred. Party-based commissions have an almost 
inevitable tendency to split along party lines. In Haiti, for example, the Provisional Electoral 
Council was made up of representatives of the political parties, but was also deeply divided 
along party lines, and internal mistrust and divisions prevented it from working efficiently.10 
In Cambodia, by contrast, a non-partisan electoral commission was widely seen as one of the 
outstanding elements of the entire UN mission. Non-partisan commissions were also a 
prominent and successful part of UN missions in Namibia and in East Timor. 
 
                                                 
9 López-Pintor 1998, 53. 
10 Nelson 1998, 76. 
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The dangers of using party-based electoral administrations was graphically demonstrated by 
Indonesia’s transitional elections in 1998. Amid the flowering of new political movements 
that often accompanies a democratic opening, a requirement that both the government and 
opposition political parties must be represented on the General Elections Commission (KPU), 
resulted in a deadlocked and unwieldy body of no less than 53 persons, most of them party 
representatives (including some individuals who were also candidates for the election). The 
result was that, during the preparation for one of the most important transitional elections of 
the 1990s, the body charged with running the elections, the KPU, became almost completely 
dysfunctional, being deeply divided along party lines and unable to take even basic decisions 
(at one stage, fist-fights broke out between different members of the commission). After the 
elections, which were administratively flawed, the Indonesians moved quickly to discard the 
party-based KPU and replace it with a much smaller, non-partisan body of 11 non-party and 
non-government representatives, many of them academics. 
 
Overall, forms of electoral assistance which serve to strengthen the capacity of electoral 
management bodies represent one of the major forms of electoral assistance to help build 
sustainable democratic governance in post-conflict societies. Assistance to electoral 
management bodies can also cover all areas of public administration such as financial 
planning, budgeting, technical support, procurement, human resources and strategic 
development; as well as issues more specifically related to the electoral arena such as large-
scale event planning, logistical support, conflict resolution training, and so on. 
 
3.4 Voter Registration Mechanisms 
Elections are a unique area of public governance, being large-scale events that need to be 
organized and coordinated on a national basis, in which virtually all adult citizens are able to 
take part. Because of this factor, and the need to collect, collate and manage data on all eligible 
voters – that is, virtually the entire adult population in most countries – the issue of voter 
registration is a key aspect of election administration, and a common source of requests for 
assistance.  
 
Voter registration is a perennial area of concern in post-conflict elections. Because nearly all 
post-conflict elections take place in an environment where basic census and other records are 
missing, workable voter registers assume even greater importance than usual. The 
construction of a comprehensive register of voters is often a first step in the bureaucratic 
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process of state-building. It is also an enormously time-consuming, logistically-challenging 
and resource-intensive process: in Cambodia, for example, the voter registration period took 
almost a full year and demanded huge amounts of time, personnel and money.  
 
Because electoral districts and polling places are often drawn and allocated on the basis of 
voter registration records, this process usually impacts on these areas too. Finally, because in 
many countries the voter’s roll represents the only form of civil register in existence, it is 
often used for wider purposes than the electoral event itself (for example, the voter register in 
East Timor was used to identify missing persons following the militia attacks that followed 
the 1999 UN plebiscite on independence). 
 
Voter registration by its nature involves collecting in a standardized format specific information 
from a vast number of separate cases (i.e. voters), and then collating and distributing this data in 
a form that can be used at election time, to ensure that only eligible electors engage in the 
voting process and also to guard against multiple voting, personation and the like. The political 
sensitivity of these issues, and the laborious nature of the task itself, means that voter 
registration is often one of the most expensive, time consuming and sometimes controversial 
parts of the entire electoral process. 
 
Best practice in regards to voter registration is often focussed on the need for a permanent and 
continuous electoral register that is constantly updated to reflect population movements, new 
voters, births and deaths, and so on.  Because of the issues noted above, the computerization of 
the voter roll and other related aspects of new technology is a commonly requested form of 
electoral assistance. The compilation and maintenance of an effective voter register (as with 
many other areas of electoral administration) lends itself readily to the application of new 
technology, particularly the issue of computerization of the electoral roll in countries which 
have not yet moved in that direction.  
 
However, computerization of electoral registers and other related databases has to be balanced 
against the reality, particularly in the poorest countries, that optimum use of new technology 
may not always be the most effective way to ensure a workable and cost-effective register of 
voters. For example, opportunities for electoral fraud via computer hacking and other 
manipulation of electronic data can actually increase with computerization. Due consideration 
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of both the possibilities as well as the limitations of information technology is thus central to 
understanding best practice in relation to voter registration. 
 
3.5 Civic and voter education programmes 
Voter and civic education programmes are another important area of electoral assistance 
activities. Over the longer-term, successful civic education programs can increase political 
participation in diverse areas of governance across a broad cross-section of society. For 
example, in most developing countries there are identifiable groups – such as the poor, 
women, indigenous people, and others -- that tend to under-participate as voters and be under-
represented as candidates and elected representatives, at competitive elections. Targeted civic 
and voter education programmes aimed at raising the participation of these groups can be 
particularly effective for advancing the long-term interests of the most disadvantaged sectors 
of society.  
 
Successful civic and voter education programmes should typically aim to create a general 
awareness and understanding of the electoral and democratic processes of a country. This is 
usually achieved by providing citizens with relevant information — through education and the 
use of various creative media — to defend their rights, promote their interests in electoral and 
other democratic fora, and contribute to society through civic actions.  Particularly in post-
conflict societies, this kind of information is usually conspicuous by its absence, and well-
designed voter education programmes can thus play an important role in the broader 
inculcation of democratic practices to a newly-enfranchised electorate. 
 
3.6 From International to Local Electoral Observation 
Traditionally, a major area of international electoral assistance comes in the area of electoral 
observation and monitoring. A wide range of international and regional actors now regularly 
observe elections, particularly fragile, transitional or highly-fraught electoral contests. Major 
actors in this field include the United Nations, the European Union, the OAS, the African 
Union, and the Commonwealth.  In addition, there are a number of democracy-promotion 
NGOs such as the Carter Center which concentrate much of their efforts on electoral 
observation.  
 
While much attention continues to be devoted to international observer missions, the most 
important development in this field in recent years has been the rise of domestic observer 
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groups. Today, a flourishing array of domestic observer groups or local monitoring 
organisations (many modelled on NAMFREL, the pioneering poll-watching group that emerged 
in the Philippines during the Marcos era), are an important part of most transitional elections. 
This proliferation of different election observation missions means that there is increasing 
pressure on the international community to provide coordination of these various observer 
groups. 
 
Because of the large number of actors in this field, coordination of technical assistance is 
crucial in situations where different bilateral and multilateral donors are all providing 
electoral assistance to a country. For example, at the Bangladesh parliamentary elections in 
2001, the United Nations Development Programme played the role of ‘implementing agent’ 
for the European Union’s own electoral observation mission. Joint observer missions are also 
increasingly common. However, questions remain about the efficacy of international observer 
missions. There are many ways to defraud an election, and observers need to be highly trained 
to detect all but the most blatant forms of electoral fraud. In many cases, however, 
international election observers are not trained professionals but rather politicians or 
bureaucrats from Western countries. Hence the renewed emphasis on building the capacity of 
domestic observer groups. 
 
3.7 Political Party Development  
Because of the underdeveloped and deeply-divided nature of post-conflict societies, elections 
often have the effect of highlighting societal fault-lines and hence laying bare very deep social 
divisions. In such circumstances, the easiest way to mobilise voter support at election time is 
often to appeal to the very same insecurities that generated the original conflict. This means 
that parties have a strong incentive to ‘play the ethnic card’ or to take hard-line positions on 
key identity-related issues, with predictable consequences for the wider process of 
democratisation. Post-communist elections in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, for example, 
resulted in the victory of extremist nationalist parties, committed to (and achieving) the break-
up of the federation. The 1993 elections in Burundi, which were supposed to elect a power-
sharing government, instead mobilised population groups along ethnic lines and served as a 
catalyst for ethnic genocide a few months later. Similarly, Bosnia’s 1996 and 1998 elections 
effectively served as ethnic censuses, with parties campaigning on ethnic lines and voters 
reacting to heightened perceptions of ethnic insecurity by electing hard-line nationalists to 
power, greatly undermining the process of democracy-building. 
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For this reason, there is an increasing focus by policy makers on the need to build broad-
based, programmatic political parties in new democracies, and to avoid the narrow, 
personalized and sectarian parties and party systems that have undermined so many new 
democracies. Particularly in societies split along ethnic lines, cross-regional and multi-ethnic 
parties that compete for the centre ground appear to be a – and perhaps the – crucial 
determinant of broader democratic consolidation and peace-building. In Kosovo, for example, 
the OSCE devoted substantial resources to introduce a network of ‘political party service 
centres’, which supported the territory’s nascent political groupings and provided them with 
logistical and material assistance – in the hope that this would help move them towards 
becoming functioning, policy-oriented political parties, rather than the narrow and 
personalized vehicles for ethnic extremists that were evident in Bosnia. The party service 
centres aim to help strengthen the organizational capacity of Kosovo’s political parties, to 
assist them develop their policy platforms and prepare for election campaigns. They have a 
particular focus on assisting parties that have demonstrated that they are viable and have a 
popular mandate.  
 
Financing political party development has been an important element of a number of post-
conflict elections. In Mozambique, for example, a trust fund was used to help RENAMO in 
particular make the transition from an army to a political party.  Financial incentives were 
vital in keeping them part of the peace process at crucial times. More recently, the United 
Nations intervention in East Timor included a significant party-development programme run 
by the UNDP. Organisations like the National Democratic Institute (NDI) have made such 
party-building assistance a particular focus of their assistance programs. Spurred on by a 
recognition of the crucial governance role that parties play in new democracies, political party 
assistance is likely to become an increasingly prominent aspect of international electoral 
assistance in the future. 
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4. Conclusion 
In the course of the 1990s, elections came to be seen not just as means of choosing 
representatives and changing governments, but as a form of conflict resolution. While there is 
no doubt that if well-designed and implemented elections can play this role, this ‘quick-fix’ 
approach to elections in post-conflict situations has created more problems than it has solved. 
There have been many elections, often conducted at the behest of the international 
community, which only served to inflame and politicize the root causes of conflict.  
 
There is no doubt that international assistance has made many important contributions to the 
conduct of post-conflict elections. Indeed, given the huge costs and logistical tasks involved, 
it is unlikely that post-conflict elections in Angola, Cambodia, Haiti, Mozambique, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone would have been held at all. However, the sustainability of international 
electoral assistance is a critical variable. The 1993 UNTAC mission in Cambodia, for 
example, spent tens of millions of dollars on introducing advanced electoral technology such 
as voter ID cards, and on training more than 50,000 Cambodians as electoral officials. 
Unfortunately, much of this initial investment and training was not maintained for future 
elections.  
 
Similarly, the international community has invested heavily in the practice of election 
monitoring, and international pressure has played an important role in keeping elections 
reasonably competitive and in persuading contestants to accept the voters’ verdict. Again, 
however, there are doubts about the extent to which this investment has been rewarded in the 
longer-term. While millions have been spent on international monitoring missions, both the 
international community and the international news media have struggled to progress beyond 
the ubiquitous ‘free and fair’ – a term which is in danger of becoming meaningless due to 
overuse – as a means of assessing the conduct of elections (Elklit and Svensson 1997). This 
terminology is problematic enough for evaluating the success of elections, and is simply 
inadequate for capturing the complexity of democratization in a post-conflict society. 
 
Democratization is a long-term process of social and political development, not a short-term 
event run by or for the international community. The impact that external interventions can 
have on democratization – particularly in post-conflict situations -- is largely limited to the 
design and construction of hardy institutions; the provision of adequate security and 
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infrastructural conditions; as well as a modest input into the norms and routines of a first 
election; and assistance to election monitoring. Beyond that, democracy is a domestic game, 
and its longer-term outcomes are very much the preserve of local actors and conditions. 
International interventions are crucial in putting in place the short-term conditions for a 
transition to democratic rule, but their longer-term impacts are necessarily limited.  
 
Given this, the most important contribution that the international community can make is to 
help establish coherent and robust political institutions, rather than to engage in broader 
attempts at social engineering. Because institutions structure the routines of behaviour in 
which political actors engage, they are crucial elements, over the longer term, in helping to 
build a moderate and sustainable political culture, in which routines of cooperation and 
accommodation come to be accepted as the norm rather than the exception. But such routines 
have to be allowed to develop organically within a facilitating institutional framework. The 
role for international actors should ultimately be to make sure that such a framework is the 
most appropriate and sustainable model that can be devised, to provide appropriate support to 
the first-time elections, and then to maintain support in subsequent elections. 
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